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ABSTRACT
It may be some time before the coalition government can establish what the content of a 
Protection of Freedoms Bill would actually be; and how the content of such may materially differ 
from one another, as well as the effects these may have on the operation or longevity of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The NHS ‘engages’ many aspects of the human right to respect for private 
and family life—not least through the emerging disciplines of ‘e-health’ and ‘health informatics’. 
NHS data protection compliance standards, it is felt, will improve in the medium to long term as a 
data protection culture becomes embedded in newer ways of working with patient information, 
for example. Indeed, these standards must improve, lest NHS organisations fall afoul of the 
relatively new powers and sanctions afforded to the ICO. Health informatics programmes will be 
the driver for this systemic change—but paradoxically, the legal framework underpinning health 
informatics programmes, from a human rights perspective, could actually threaten the legitimacy 
of these selfsame health informatics programmes.
Databases operated by public authorities in 
the UK, including NHS organisations, have 
been praised and decried as many things, on 
a scale ranging from invaluable to Orwellian 
(Anderson et al, 2009; Anderson et al, 2007). 
Their lawfulness, rather than their morality 
or utility, is sometimes a thornier quality 
to measure. The suggestions from some 
quarters that the ‘database state’ comprises 
degrees of unlawfulness in the operations of 
different categories and purposes of public-
sector e-governance have been firmly rebutted 
(Ministry of Justice, 2009).
Health informatics programmes are mainly 
legislatively enabled in the UK by the blandly-
worded and broadly-described powers afforded 
the Secretary of State for Health in S.2 of the 
National Health Service Act 2006, as noted 
by the Ministry of Justice (Ministry of Justice, 
2009). 
This bland and ambiguous wording is in 
danger of being challenged through the courts 
via the Simms principle—which requires the 
clear and unambiguous wording of legislation 
to strip away our human rights. The NHS (and 
the Department of Health) must surely prefer 
a clearly-worded power to ‘engage’ peoples’ 
information rights, as opposed to an ambiguous 
legislative wording that is constitutionally 
suspect—though sadly this is not currently the 
case for all NHS health informatics programmes.
Section 2(1) provides:
The Secretary of State may— 
(a) provide such services as he considers 
appropriate for the purpose of discharging any 
duty imposed on him by this Act, and 
(b) do anything else which is calculated to 
facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the 
discharge of such a duty.
Connecting for Health and 
Caldicott Guardianship
‘Connecting for Health’ is the banner under 
which the national programmes and policies 
for transforming healthcare in the UK through 
electronic governance are grouped; and the 
initiatives are strategically managed by the 
Department of Health.
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The NHS has given patients and service users 
a guarantee that their personal information 
will be well looked-after (NHS, 2007). Local 
responsibility for upholding this patient 
information standard falls to the holder of the 
‘Caldicott guardianship’ for that particular local 
NHS organisation. Caldicott guardianships 
are co-ordinated nationally in an attempt to 
standardise the controls and protection of 
patient data (Connecting for Health, 2010a). 
The Department of Health is tasked with 
disseminating guidelines and good-practice with 
respect to these standards and others regarding 
patient confidentiality (Department of Health, 
2003).
Care Records
The Summary Care Record (or the Emergency 
Care Summary across Scotland) is a nationally-
accessible snapshot of the care a person has 
received from the NHS in the UK, that provides a 
limited medical record for any potential patient, 
and is designed to save vital time and avoid 
costly and potentially-fatal errors in pressured 
care and emergency contexts. Importantly, the 
SCR is ‘opt-out’ in implementation amongst 
cohorts of patients. Access is not particularly 
limited with regard to the number of NHS 
healthcare professionals who have the ability to 
use the SCR, but access is strictly controlled in 
terms of security and in the way the use of the 
SCR is audited on a user-by-user basis.
It is of course S.2 of the National Health 
Service Act 2006 which the Ministry of Justice 
draws upon to assert the legality and lawfulness 
of the Summary Care record (Ministry of Justice, 
2009).
In a small study conducted by this author, 
and using figures obtained through using the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000, it has been 
observed that less than 1% of people under the 
auspices of the Primary Care Trust in Dudley 
took the opportunity to opt-out of the SCR when 
such an opportunity was communicated to them. 
Scaled up across England and Wales, this still 
represents potentially hundreds of thousands of 
NHS patients who will initially or eventually opt 
out of the SCR programme. This creates a small 
but significant problem and some measurable 
loss of efficacy of the SCR pr ogramme. There are 
also ethical, if not legal issues, around the choice 
of an opt-in system for patient cohorts under the 
SCR programme.
The Ministry of Justice has noted that:
‘A complex control framework limits access to 
the DCR to those involved in an individual’s care 
(termed a ‘legitimate relationship’). Access is 
by smartcard and an audit trail of all activity is 
maintained. Additional controls termed ‘sealed 
envelopes’ are being developed and these will 
enable a patient to restrict access to sensitive 
items within the record.’ (Ministry of Justice, 
2009).
This is just as well. The National Health 
Service is a vast composite organisation, and it 
In a small study, less 
than 1% of people took the 
opportunity to opt out of the 
SCR. This creates a small but 
significant problem and some 
measurable loss of efficacy of 
the SCR programme. There 
are also ethical, if not legal 
issues around the choice of an 
opt-in system
‘
‘
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is essential for the protection of patient privacy, 
safety and confidentiality that access to an entire 
record of an individual’s medical history and 
conditions be restricted to an appropriately local 
and specific division of any NHS organisation. 
The Detailed Care Record, as a patient 
information system, aims above all things to 
protect the integrity, quality and availability of 
patient data that will often prove vital in care 
contexts.
Again, the Ministry of Justice has sought 
to clarify the legality and lawfulness of this 
particular national database, but does not 
directly cite the provisions of S.2 of the NHS Act 
2006 to support their rebuttal of legal concerns 
in this particular regard (Ministry of Justice, 
2009).
Secondary uses service 
The National Health Service in the UK has been 
challenged to transform the way that it uses 
patient information to conduct research which 
informs clinical practices (Connecting for Health, 
2010b). This research is to be underpinned 
by April 2011 by the access a multitude of 
researchers will have to the ‘pseudonymised’ 
health data records of all NHS services users 
and patients. This notion of ‘pseudonymisation’, 
itself a technique of anonymising large data sets 
but retaining great statistical worth in them, 
allows NHS organisations to trade in this data 
for research purposes without falling afoul of the 
‘non-disclosure’ provisions of the Data Protection 
Act 1998 and the common law of confidentiality 
(Ministry of Justice, 2009).
Again, the Ministry of Justice has sought to 
clarify the legality of this database (Ministry of 
Justice, 2009) by drawing on the wording of S.2 
of the National Health Service Act 2006.
An important idea though is that while there 
may always be research and development of 
technical measures which help ensure the 
security of patient information in transformative 
healthcare settings (Huang et al, 2009), there 
may not always be a culture of protection and 
respect for human rights in healthcare; simply 
put, we can probably do anything securely with 
patient data; but what is ultimately to halt what 
we do with it?
Health and social care research
S.251 of the NHS Act 2006 allows for an 
application process, by which health researchers 
can receive permission from the Ethics and 
Confidentiality Committee of the National 
Information Governance Board of the NHS, 
through the delegated authority of the Health 
Secretary, to obtain entire, un-redacted, 
identifiable patient records for their use in 
research programmes. The Act clearly states that 
the common law of confidentiality is overridden 
in these circumstances.
Professor Dame Joan Higgins, formerly Chair 
of the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee 
(ECC) of the National Information Governance 
Board of the NHS, has noted that it is difficult 
to balance the need for the most effective health 
and social care research with the need to respect 
the sensitivities of patient confidentiality. 
However, there can be circumstances where 
society’s need for effective research in the areas 
that impact upon public health outweighs 
notions of patient rights and confidentiality. 
Higgins noted: ‘In many ways, the greatest 
challenge for the ECC in the future is the same 
as the challenge which [Patient Information 
Advisory Group] faced when it began work in 
2001. That is how to support high quality health 
care research, using patient information, whilst 
protecting the interests of patients and ensuring 
that their confidentiality is not breached. It is 
about making sure that an appropriate balance 
is achieved between these two goals. However, 
there have been some more recent changes which 
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create new pressures. 
n It is essential that trust between patients 
and healthcare professionals, in the NHS, is 
maintained. Patients need to feel that whatever 
information they share with professionals will 
be held in confidence. If this trust is lost then 
the whole basis of care is undermined. Recent 
losses of sensitive data and inappropriate 
sharing of, and access to, health records may 
be starting to weaken this sense of trust. 
n  Increasingly, we are seeing requests from 
researchers to ‘link’ data for different data sets. 
This is essential for certain kinds of research 
but it also increases the risk of breaching 
confidentiality, not just where identifiable 
information is linked but also where 
anonymised information is linked but ‘small 
numbers’ (e.g. in specific geographical areas) 
may reveal patients’ identities. There is no easy  
solution to this problem. 
n Finally, there is the problem of third party 
information in   patients’ records. Ensuring 
that the confidentiality of third parties is not 
breached, as well as that of patients, is also a 
particular challenge.’ (Higgins, 2009)
Data protection law in the UK 
The effect of the 1998 Act
The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998) 
heralded the adoption in the UK of the EC 
Directive on Data Protection (Directive 95/46/
EC on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data). There have been 
suggestions in the literature that the Directive 
could have been implemented with greater 
clarity (Robinson et al, 2009). In our common 
law jurisdiction in the UK issues of clarity will 
be resolved organically over time through the 
creation of precedents, as Lord Hope suggested 
(in Common Services Agency v Scottish 
Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47 at 
47), when he wished that the Directive had been 
more directly incorporated into UK law.
Under the DPA 1998, individuals have the 
right of access to their own personal data, 
generally, and written permission is again, 
generally, required for the disclosure of personal 
data identifying an individual to another data 
controller. The word ‘generally’ is key, since 
these two core values of the DPA 1998 are subject 
to various exemptions.
Generally speaking, the operation of the DPA 
1998 places duties on the controllers of personal 
data in the UK and affords certain rights to 
individuals in connection with their personal 
data. The working core of the DPA 1998 is the set 
of eight Data Protection Principles (DPP) which 
underpin the Act.
The most vital of the Principles is naturally the 
first (DPP 1)—which tells us that the processing 
of personal data must be done by data controllers 
in a way that is fair and lawful. This amounts to 
the notion that personal data must be treated 
as confidential, given that ‘lawfulness’ includes, 
in the UK at least, compliance and accordance 
with the common law (which evolves in the 
courts). For UK public authorities this entails 
affording all individuals due process rights and 
human rights in respect of processing their 
personal data, given our body of common law in 
the UK that addresses these administrative and 
constitutional legal issues, respectively.
The ‘middle six’ of the Data Protection 
Principles (DPP 2–7) afford rights to 
individuals—through placing duties on data 
controllers to respect the personal data of 
individuals in certain key ways: deleting it 
when necessary or when it is no longer needed, 
amending it to be accurate, and so on. Notable 
because of its inclusion in addressing practical 
issues is DPP 7, which requires that ‘appropriate 
organisational and technical measures’ be 
taken to safeguard data and the individual and 
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KeyPOINTS
n Electronic governance can and is transforming the way the NHS 
delivers healthcare
n The practicalities and ethics of e-health are separate, though still 
contentious, issues compared with the legalities of e-governance 
practices in healthcare.
n The legalities of e-governance practices in healthcare could be 
far more transparent, and the legislative empowerment of those 
practices could be far more unambiguous and purposeful. This 
would avoid the potentially costly situation of a systemic NHS 
e-governance project being declared unlawful in the scope or 
process of its operation.
collective confidentiality of data subjects.
The Data Protection Act 1998, in including the 
eighth and final DPP, also seeks to regulate the 
manner in which the personal data of individuals 
is transferred between data controllers in the 
UK and data controllers and processors in 
different jurisdictions. The protection of data 
must be commensurate between the UK law 
and the law in any other jurisdiction to which 
data is transferred—not too much of an issue 
in EC territories, given the Directive (95/46/
EC on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data); or for the USA, 
since the Information Commissioner here in 
the UK has determined that the American ‘Safe 
Harbor’ scheme is adequate data protection for 
transferral purposes.
From a wide perspective, the Information 
Commissioner has noted that our society in the 
UK evidences both positives and negatives when 
it comes to the protection of personal data, and 
hence personal, informational privacy.
Public authorities are not helped by some 
areas and practices concerning data protection 
and perceptions of the DPA 1998 being unclear 
and confused. The Information Commissioner 
has criticised the ‘legal landscape’ of personal 
informational privacy; while at the same time 
calling for UK public authorities to be more 
accepting of the need to share huge volumes 
of personal information in the name of better 
electronic governance; and to be bolder and 
more proactive in their approach (Thomas & 
Walport, 2008). 
Public authorities, like NHS organisations, in 
breach of the DPA 1998 typically find themselves 
the recipients of an Enforcement Notice from the 
Information Commissioner; who is the relevant 
public body to conclude there has been a breach 
in some way. [replace?: the public body that 
decides if breaches have been made in this way]
Though there are criminal sanctions found 
within the DPA 1998—S.55 of the 1998 Act 
creates an offence of recklessly or maliciously 
losing or supplying data—prosecutions rarely 
result from data breaches. 
The Information Commissioner has been 
granted new powers to fine organisations up 
to £500 000 for the most flagrant or severe 
breaches of the DPA 1998. Fines can be levied up 
to £500 000 under a Monetary Penalty Notice 
which can be issued under S.55A of the DPA 
1998. It remains to be seen how organisations 
in the public and private spheres may adopt a 
different ‘risk model’ when it comes to caring 
about systematic compliance with the DPA 1998 
now that there is the possibility of such large 
fines compared to the previous potential tariff of 
only £5 000. 
Self-regulation and self-reporting, and the 
self-enforcement of data protection standards, 
is currently what the ICO expects organisations 
to undertake habitually in order to remain 
compliant with the DPA 1998. Certainly, the ICO 
has been encouraging businesses and public-
sector organisations to think about the hidden 
costs through ‘breach management’ and ‘disaster 
recovery’, as well as public relations damage that 
sometimes occurs when a ‘data breach’ manifests 
itself as a leak or goes public. NHS organisations 
feature prominently in lists of concerning data 
protection breaches and information losses 
—showing only that they are vulnerable in the 
‘human error’ sense of the design and operation 
of information technology.
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